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Trade and investment agreements are disputed because they limit the regulatory autonomy of 
national legislatures of participating countries. This is particularly true of mega-regionals given 
their expanded scope. On that account, negotiators build safeguards into the agreements with a 
view to containing the intrusion into the national legal order. The debate revolves around 
whether the envisaged safeguards are sufficient to achieve that goal or whether, de lege 
ferenda, more needs to be done to find the right power balance. The present essay, first of all, 
elucidates the extent of sovereignty loss as a result of mega-regionals, and secondly, explores 
some options to secure policy space for national lawmakers, such as the use of broader 
exception clauses or the setting of guidelines for the calculation of damages.  
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I. Introduction 
Mega-regionals are about to become the most significant building blocks of the world 
economic order. Many constituencies are concerned, however, that national sovereignty is sold 
out through the back door by their governments concluding treaties like the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) or the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). The 
protection of foreign investments therein and, in particular, the provision of investor–State 
dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms came to the fore.1 An ISDS clause gives foreign 
investors, i.e. private entities, legal standing before international tribunals. In other words, they 
can challenge the way they are treated by host States. As a result, those tribunals have the 
power to review the legality of acts of a host State, including acts of parliament.2 The attendant 
fear is that general elections are undermined if a newly elected government cannot change the 
law3 because of international obligations entered into by the old government.4 
Mega-regionals are transcontinental trade and investment agreements that account for a 
substantial share of world trade: the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
and CETA connect North America with Europe; the TPP connects Pacific Rim countries; and 
 
 
  This article draws on C. Riffel, ‘Mega-Regionals’ in R. Wolfrum and F. Lachenmann (eds), Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law Thematic Series vol.1 International Economic Law (OUP 2016). 
1  ‘Wallonia is Adamantly Blocking the EU’s Trade Deal with Canada’ (22 October 2016) The Economist. 
2  S. Lester, ‘Rethinking the International Investment Law System’ (2015) 49 Journal of World Trade 211, 216. 
3  Without the consent of the other contracting parties. 
4  J. Stiglitz, Beware of TPP’s Investor – State Dispute Settlement Provision (Roosevelt Forward 28 March 
2016), available at http://rooseveltforward.org/ (accessed 27 March 2017). 
 
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) connects Asia with Australia and 
New Zealand. The parallel negotiation of these mega-regionals made international economic 
law one of the most dynamic areas of international law in recent years. The North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)5 served as a model for the TPP; and CETA is widely seen as 
a stepping stone for TTIP. 
The Waitangi Tribunal held in 2016 that the TPP is not at variance with the principles of the 
Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand.6 In Germany, a case was brought against CETA before 
the Federal Constitutional Court on sovereignty grounds; applications for a preliminary 
injunction seeking to enjoin Germany from signing CETA did not succeed.7 A similar 
complaint is pending in Canada.8 Creeping loss of sovereignty, actual and alleged, was one of 
the reasons that lead to Brexit. Yet, this is not a new phenomenon. For the same reason, the US 
Congress rejected the Havana Charter in 1950, which would have created the International 
Trade Organization, the precursor to the World Trade Organization (WTO).9  
 Interplay between Sovereignty, Regulatory Autonomy, and Democracy 
One can see the building of the world economic order as the struggle to strike a balance between 
the regulatory autonomy of States, on the one hand, and the prerequisites for a functioning 
system, on the other hand.10 The more is regulated internationally, the less autonomy is left to 
national lawmakers. When building a bridge from two sides, both parties need to agree on the 
height, width and position of the bridge to be built. To that extent the parties have to constrain 
themselves for the two ends to fit. 
National sovereignty is acknowledged in Art. 2 (7) Charter of the United Nations (UN 
Charter).11 Making international commitments, in a sense, is an expression of sovereignty.12 
When a pollutant is carcinogenic and States therefore agree for public health reasons to ban 
that pollutant within their respective territories, they thereby restrict their sovereignty. If the 
party to a treaty is a democracy, the consequent loss of sovereignty is generally accompanied 
by a loss of democracy, as the international regime is not committed to democratic 
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representation.13 The more integrative the regime, the more pressing the issue of democratic 
feedback. The European Union sought to address this problem through the creation of the 
European Parliament and extending its competences over time.14 However, an even greater 
diminution of powers of national parliaments tends to ensue from the realization of more 
democracy at the international level, because competences are taken away from national 
legislative bodies and allocated to the international institution. This reveals a potential conflict 
between regulatory autonomy, i.e. State sovereignty, and the principle of democracy.  
Why are mega-regionals special? Mega-regionals increase the level of trade liberalization 
among constituent members beyond the most-favoured-nation (MFN) level of the Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement).15 However, mega-regionals are 
not only directed at trade liberalization.16 Their main thrust appears to be standard- and rule-
setting.17 Consequently, their regulatory scope exceeds that of the WTO. They contain, for 
instance, chapters on ‘trade and’ topics such as labour.18 Moreover, the TPP is the first 
agreement to proactively tackle currency manipulation.19 As a corollary, the WTO Agreement 
merely sets the framework within which mega-regionals will operate, linked to the WTO by 
virtue of Art. XXIV General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)20 and Art. V General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).21 Wherever a mega-regional provides special rules 
for the relationship between members, those rules will prevail in lieu of WTO rules.  
 Loss of Sovereignty Resulting from Mega-Regionals 
In the past, the discussion on free trade agreements (FTAs) focussed on the interaction between 
these agreements and the WTO and the question of whether the former are conducive to the 
latter or a threat to it.22 In the context of mega-regionals, the focus is on the implications which 
mega-regionals have for the domestic legal order. The secrecy surrounding their negotiation 
and high-profile cases like the Plain Packaging23 cases only reinforced the above-mentioned 
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misgivings.24 When the TPP was negotiated, the participants agreed to a confidentiality 
agreement.25 Only after considerable public pressure and a Decision of the European 
Ombudsman to that effect26 has the European Commission released its TTIP negotiating 
documents. To hold negotiations of mega-regionals in a transparent way that involves all 
relevant stakeholders (e.g., by including representatives of the legislative branch in the 
negotiation teams) is not only important to ensure ratification down the road, but also because 
these mega-regionals have a systemic bearing on participating economies, more so than other 
FTAs. They will determine the parameters of how to do business. With good reason, 
Petersmann calls them ‘international treaties with legislative functions.’27  
The quandary of mega-regionals lies in the fact that, by nature, the regulation of trade and 
foreign investment is internationalized, whereas adjacent policy fields such as consumer safety 
are left to national legislatures (which are or are not democratically legitimized). From an 
international perspective, there are regulatory gaps. From a national perspective, the crux is 
whether sufficient policy space is left to protect public welfare objectives. The underlying issue 
is with how much of their sovereignty countries are willing to dispense for the sake of global 
governance. 
The danger from a national vantage point is that the international regime develops a life of 
its own. If the national legislature is a democratically elected body, the concern is that 
competences are shifted to regulatory bodies, established under mega-regionals, through built-
in further integration clauses, for example, under the heading of regulatory cooperation.28 It is 
feared that those clauses enable governments to approximate national laws without 
parliamentary approval. Under the TPP and CETA, the representatives on the respective 
regulatory cooperation bodies29 will be government officials only, not parliamentarians.30 
Panels, by contrast, are pre-empted from adding to or diminishing the rights and obligations of 
the parties under those agreements.31  
The legal means employed to keep the intrusion into the national legal order in check, that 
is, to preserve regulatory autonomy, is the topic of the present paper. It ventures to outline in 
part II the different approaches taken by negotiators to safeguard domestic policy space. These 
safeguards can be of a procedural or substantive nature. Part III concludes and makes policy 
recommendations, particularly for TTIP and RCEP, the negotiations of which are still ongoing. 
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II. Safeguards against Sovereignty Loss 
The trend towards mega-regionals is fuelled by the failure of the Doha Round, where it has 
proved increasingly difficult to reach agreement among the membership of currently 164 
countries.32 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that mega-regionals are not concerned 
with the economic rights of nationals. New Zealand, for instance, cannot violate the TPP vis-
à-vis New Zealanders, as a transaction between two New Zealanders taking place in New 
Zealand would not be governed by the TPP. The supply of goods and services from the South 
Island to the North Island would be governed by New Zealand law, as would the acquisition of 
a company in Christchurch by a New Zealander. That said, intellectual property (IP) holders 
are going to benefit from generally higher levels of protection resultant from the TPP in their 
own countries. Unlike the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS Agreement),33 which obligates the WTO Members to ‘accord the treatment provided 
for in this Agreement to the nationals of other Members,’34 ch. 18 (Intellectual Property) of the 
TPP does not contain a similar limitation to nationals of other TPP Members.35 Ergo, one IP 
standard is to be applied across the board. This TRIPS-plus standard will have to be 
multilateralized, because, unlike GATT and GATS, the TRIPS Agreement does not have an 
economic integration exception clause.36 
 No Direct Effect  
Mega-regionals do not pursue the goal of political integration. The lack of a secretariat in the 
TPP and CETA speaks volumes in that regard. In line with this, mega-regionals have no direct 
effect in the legal order of the members; monist members that is, as direct effect is 
inconceivable in dualist countries.37 Not only do mega-regionals not prescribe direct effect, 
they even go one step further and explicitly proscribe a right of action against another member 
under domestic law.38 Even if a monist system did not negate direct effect, this does not say 
anything about the status international rules have in the internal hierarchy of norms. Should 
they be at the same level as statutes, as is the case more often than not, they would not take 
precedence over an act of parliament that is at odds with international law.  
From the denial of direct effect, the following follows: Firstly, mega-regionals have to be 
implemented into national law and only the act of implementation creates legal effects in the 
national legal order. Secondly, the denial gives States the leeway to break their international 
obligations, at least from a national law perspective. Failing that, that is, if direct effect was a 
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reality, States would be deprived of this option of ‘efficient breach.’39 In that sense, the national 
legal system is shielded from international law. At the same time, this puts a stop to the 
development that the EU Treaties took, viz. into ‘a new legal order of international law.’40 In 
the final analysis, policy space is gained by less strict compliance with international law.  
a. No Redress under Domestic Law 
The other side of the coin is that, absent direct effect, domestic courts could not remedy a 
violation of mega-regionals because national rules are not measured against international law. 
Given that domestic courts are bound by domestic law, they can only provide redress as long 
as domestic law is in conformity with mega-regionals. Still, they would need to flesh out the 
interpretive scope that domestic law provides consistently with international law (doctrine of 
consistent interpretation).41 This emanates from the obligation in Art. 26 Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention)42 to perform a treaty ‘in good faith.’43 
i. Discrimination of Foreign Investors under Domestic Law 
So the question is whether national law affords the same guarantees as international law.44 In 
the context of the TTIP negotiations, the argument was put forward that both contracting 
parties, the United States and the European Union, have an independent court system, well 
capable of dispensing justice to investors from the other party.45 Interestingly, the suspended 
Canada–US FTA did not contain an ISDS clause; nor does the Australia–New Zealand 
Investment Protocol on account of ‘the high level of mutual recognition of each other’s well 
established judicial systems.’46 The TPP will not alter that.47 
With respect to some rights and obligations, US and EU law afford an equivalent level of 
protection. For instance, both parties recognize a right to property, which encompasses the 
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property of foreigners. Both legal systems acknowledge an obligation of the State to 
compensate when the State dispossesses someone of its property.48 Both guarantee a right to 
be heard in their domestic laws.49 Importantly, both orders acknowledge that those rights also 
apply to non-citizens; the respective legal texts speak of ‘person’ or ‘everyone.’50 In the case 
of the United States and the European Union, the aforementioned rights have constitutional 
status. But there are other rights that are not equally reflected in the national legal orders, for 
example, fair and equitable treatment (FET). Those investors’ rights would lack a remedy 
without ISDS and require the involvement of the investor’s State of nationality.  
ii. Discrimination of Nationals as a Result of ISDS51 
The opposite question, namely discrimination of nationals as a result of ISDS, is pending 
before the German constitutional court, the Federal Constitutional Court. The applicants 
challenge the fact that, as compared to nationals, foreign investors have an additional avenue 
to pursue their interests.52 It is contested whether the envisaged establishment of the CETA 
Tribunal53 is at variance with the German constitution, notably Art. 3 (1) Basic Law, because 
legal standing is conferred on foreign investors, but not on nationals.54  
Art. 3 (1) Basic Law establishes the principle of equality before the law for the German legal 
order. It reads as follows: ‘All persons shall be equal before the law.’55 This precept binds all 
branches of German government, including the legislature.56 It obligates the German legislature 
to treat as equal what is basically equal and as different what is basically different.57 Thus, the 
German legislature must ensure equality before German law, i.e., the law the legislature is 
responsible for. What about equality before international law? The issue in the present case is 
whether the principle of equality precludes Germany from acceding to an international regime 
that grants foreigner investors procedural rights that are not available to national investors.  
At this juncture, it bears recalling that international law is not concerned with the 
discrimination of nationals. Investment law sets an international minimum standard whose 
purpose it is to protect foreigners, not nationals. In short, CETA does not guarantee German 
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investors any rights in Germany. Still, both German and Canadian investors in Germany have 
an international avenue at their disposal where they can pursue their proprietary interests: 
Foreign investors will be able to rely on CETA. The ‘possessions’ held by Germans in 
Germany are protected internationally by virtue of Art. 1 Protocol to the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR). That is, the designated forum before which Germans can assert 
their proprietary interests against the German government, after having exhausted all domestic 
remedies,58 is the European Court of Human Rights. Unlike the German constitutional court, 
which can void a law that violates the German constitution, the European Court of Human 
Rights does not have the authority to void national law that is inconsistent with the ECHR. 
Instead, the Court can find a violation of the Convention and grant ‘just satisfaction’ within the 
meaning of Art. 41 ECHR, which encompasses pecuniary damages.59  
On a related note, Canadians within the jurisdiction of Germany enjoy the rights and 
freedoms of the ECHR.60 Contrariwise, the basic rights of the German constitution, such as the 
protection of property in Art. 14 Basic Law, do not apply to Canadian juridical persons.61 
Hence, Canadian companies may have standing before the European Court on Human Rights, 
but cannot challenge German law before the Federal Constitutional Court. Commensurate with 
German law, the seat of a juridical person determines whether it is treated as ‘domestic’ within 
the meaning of Art. 19 (3) Basic Law.62 If a foreign company operates through a subsidiary 
established in Germany, the subsidiary is deemed to be domestic from the point of view of 
German law.63 That is to say, the subsidiary could invoke Art. 14 Basic Law in a constitutional 
complaint.64 
Any claim of inequality presupposes comparability. The comparators at issue are national 
investors as governed by German law, on the one hand, and foreign investors as protected under 
CETA, on the other hand. Art. 3 (1) Basic Law would not apply if the unequal treatment could 
be ascribed to different legislatures.65 Thus, the Federal Constitutional Court did not find a 
violation of Art. 3 (1) Basic Law when Germans residing in one federal State had special 
privileges on the basis of a State law that deviated from the federal law or the law of other 
States, privileges which were not obtainable to Germans residing somewhere else in the Federal 
Republic.66 Nonetheless, the prevailing view regards Art. 3 (1) Basic Law as applicable to 
situations where the discrimination of nationals results from European Union law.67 Following 
this, Art. 3 (1) Basic Law can remedy the discrimination of nationals by forcing the German 
government to treat Germans like EU citizens.  
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It is true that the German legislature is involved in the making of international law when, 
for example, ratifying a treaty in accordance with Art. 14 Vienna Convention. However, CETA 
is a mixed agreement, undergoing ratification at both EU and Member State level.68 As to 
‘foreign direct investment,’ the European Union has the exclusive competence pursuant to Art. 
3 (1) (e) in conjunction with Art. 207 (1) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU).69 This includes the resolution of investment disputes.70 As it falls within the purview 
of the European legislature, the German ratification act to CETA would not concern the 
investment chapter thereof.  
All things considered, we can conclude that different legislatures are responsible for the 
treatment of foreign investors, on the one hand, and national investors, on the other hand. 
Consequently, the precondition for an application of Art. 3 (1) Basic Law is not given, namely 
comparability. The German legislature could not accord to nationals the same treatment as to 
foreign investors and, without the consent of Canada and the European Union, grant nationals 
legal standing before the CETA Tribunal. It would lack the competence to do so. In the final 
analysis, Art. 3 (1) Basic Law does not guarantee equal access of nationals to international 
tribunals, only to courts within the jurisdiction of the Federal Republic. Things are less 
straightforward for Germany’s bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with an ISDS clause, as in 
these cases Art. 3 (1) Basic Law would not be ruled out a priori. Those BITs shall be replaced 
step by step by EU treaties.71  
b. Resolution of Investment Disputes 
Some countries, e.g. Australia and India, are contemplating scrapping ISDS altogether.72 
Others have withdrawn from the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.73 
However, to be effective, rules need to be enforceable. This is true of rules of national as well 
as international law.74 The aforementioned enforcement deficit caused by the lack of direct 
effect is exactly the gap that ISDS seeks to fill. Besides, in some cases, the rights of non-citizens 
may not be easily discernible. The national law definition of what constitutes ‘property’ is not 
necessarily congruent with the international understanding of ‘investment.’ ISDS thus reduces 
the legal risk for investors going into a foreign jurisdiction, which is one factor in their overall 
risk assessment.  
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Moreover, a report of the World Economic Forum shows that the court systems of some 
countries are notoriously biased towards the national government.75 Some of them are 
designated members of mega-regionals. So it would be hard, particularly for a foreigner, to 
take the State to court (and get a just ruling) in countries where the courts basically function as 
an extended arm of the government. It is worth calling to mind that Art. 26 Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID 
Convention)76 provides that, as a rule, consent to ISDS excludes local remedies.  
One of the criticisms levelled at ISDS is that it mainly serves the interests of multinational 
corporations, i.e. particular entities.77 By their very nature, it is difficult to think of them in 
terms of national/foreign, one of the premises of investment law.78 Private entities take legal 
action against governments in administrative proceedings all the time. That they can do so is 
considered a hallmark of the rule of law. It is evident, however, that resources are necessary 
(e.g. for legal expenses) to take full advantage of ISDS. No difference is made depending on 
the legal nature of the private entity, be it a natural or juridical person. Juridical persons are 
used by natural persons, for instance, to limit their personal liability.  
The ultimate objective of investment protection is to rein in arbitrary law-making of the host 
State. It is sometimes criticized that international investment law guarantees foreign investors 
rights without concurrently imposing obligations on them, for example, with respect to human 
rights or environmental protection. It seems axiomatic that property entails social 
responsibility.79 With that in mind, Lester laments a ‘structural bias,’ which stems from the fact 
that, while investors can take legal action against States, States cannot sue investors.80 In truth, 
States do not need to. They have the monopoly on use of force in their territory and can regulate 
the behaviour of foreign investors within their jurisdiction through legislative and 
administrative acts, which may be subject to scrutiny. Again, this is evocative of the similarity 
between investment and administrative law: an authority does not sue citizens in order to 
prompt a particular behaviour (e.g. the payment of a fee, the removal of a road obstacle, etc.), 
it issues an administrative act, the legality of which can then be challenged before the courts if 
citizens feel that their rights, e.g. constitutional guarantees, have been violated by that act. If a 
host State wants to force foreign investors to comply with, let us say, core labour standards, it 
can simply implement those into national law, thus making them mandatory for both foreign 
and national investors. In such a constellation, a foreign investor would be unable to invoke 
the concept of FET should it seek to evade core labour standards, as its expectations are to be 
based on the law, including the international law, as it stood when the investment was made.81 
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Expectations of a foreign investor to the contrary would not be considered as legitimate.82 So 
a host State would be free to obligate a foreign investor to observe core labour standards as 
long as it did not discriminate. This would not be the case if a general law of the host State 
applied to foreign as well as national investors alike. According to the prevailing view, 
international human rights obligations are State obligations.83 That is, private entities, such as 
foreign investors, are not obliged to protect human rights, States are.84 Hence, States have to 
put in place mechanisms to that effect, which then apply to foreign investors as well.  
Actually, it is not so much the provision of ISDS that divest States of their regulatory 
freedom, but the substantive rights, which suggests that negotiators should focus on them.85 
Justiciability ensures compliance but does not add to the obligations States have under an 
agreement. Legal standing does not expand investors’ rights ipso facto. It sets the stakes for 
non-compliance higher. The fact is bemoaned that investors’ rights, i.e. proprietary and 
monetary interests, are better protected internationally than human rights. In truth, it is 
regularly national governments that perpetrate human rights violations against people within 
their jurisdiction. Investment law harks back to the law of aliens, which, in turn, is based on 
the fact that foreigners have no say in national policy-making as a matter of principle.86 As a 
rule, they are excluded from participating in general elections. Their home State cannot protect 
them in the territory of the host State by reason of national sovereignty. International 
investment law plugs that gap. The question is simple: would people invest hundreds of 
millions of dollars in a politically unstable country without international guarantees? Therefore, 
a State that is contemplating an international investment agreement without ISDS has to assess 
two things: firstly, whether the legal order of the other contracting parties provides adequate 
protection for investments of its own nationals, and secondly, whether inter-State adjudication 
will be sufficient to attract foreign direct investment. For the alternative to ISDIS is inter-State 
adjudication. If an ISDS clause exists, it will take precedence according to Art. 27 (1) ICSID 
Convention.  
Trade disputes are resolved through inter-State adjudication, as traders have no legal 
standing.87 Their interests are represented by their home State. This poses the question of how 
the different treatment of traders and investors can be justified. In a nutshell, it is more at stake 
for investors because they cast in their lot with the host State. Whereas an exporter can sell 
elsewhere, an investor is stuck in the jurisdiction of the host State.  
Should the negotiators have left the issue of dispute settlement unregulated, general 
international law would apply, i.e. the Articles on State Responsibility.88 A violation of 
investors’ rights, e.g. an expropriation without compensation, could be answered by 
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countermeasures by the home State.89 In concreto, this means the suspension of the rights of 
investors from the violating country. So for enforcement under general international law to be 
effective, nationals from both countries must have invested in the respective other country. 
Otherwise, the suspending country would have no leverage. 
c. Assessment 
The problem is rooted in the fact that tribunals deal with individual cases, while national 
legislatures are charged with weighing up competing societal interests in the abstract in light 
of scarcity of resources. Investment tribunals are criticized for not being democratically 
legitimized. When lamenting their lack of legitimacy, we also have to ask the question: 
legitimate in the eyes of whom – those whose case is adjudicated (foreign investors) or the 
general public?  
In the context of adjudicatory bodies, legitimacy relates to the question of whether the power 
of such bodies is accepted by those subject to their authority.90 To ban popular vote from the 
courtroom is exactly the raison d'être of ISDS. The general public is represented by the 
government in international court proceedings. Tribunals are not democratically controlled but 
independent of popular influence for good – due process – reasons. Their function is to protect 
the individual against the tyranny of the majority.  
This raises the question of standard of review. An international tribunal can either accept 
the legislative outcome as presented or substitute its own weighing-up for that of the legislature 
or scrutinize if the legislature acted arbitrarily (e.g., by not taking into account all relevant 
interests). If a tribunal simply accepted the legislative outcome, even if the result of a 
democratic process, the tribunal would not live up to its mandate. On the other hand, if the 
tribunal nolens volens replaced the legislative weighing-up with its own, it would not show any 
deference to the democratic decision. In the author’s view, the solution is to be found in the 
proper calibration of the proportionality test.91 
The European Union and Canada broke the mould with CETA and proposed a standing 
body with an appeal mechanism instead of ad hoc tribunals. Future developments have to be 
awaited. 
 Jurisdictional Carve-outs 
a. Carve-out in CETA 
Another way to strengthen regulatory autonomy is to curtail the jurisdiction of tribunals by 
excluding either particular provisions or even entire policy fields. Art. 8.18.1 lays out the scope 
of ISDS for the purposes of CETA. It does neither encompass Section B, the establishment of 
investments, nor the national treatment obligation in Section C92 with respect to the 
establishment and acquisition of investments. It follows from this that the pre-entry stage is not 
covered. Hence, foreign investors could not sue for market access under CETA.  
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This is different for the TPP. The investment chapter therein is comprised of two sections: 
Section A contains investors’ rights and Section B provides for ISDS. According to Art. 9.19.1 
TPP, all substantive rights set forth in Section A are actionable, including the full national 
treatment obligation in Art. 9.4 TPP. This provision is modelled on Art. 1102 NAFTA. Both 
NAFTA and the TPP extend the national treatment obligation to the establishment and 
acquisition of investments. It is accepted that Art. 1102 NAFTA ensures market access.93 As 
far as the TPP is concerned, this result is borne out by the fact that, in Annex II, Members 
reserved the right to approve (and refuse) investments beyond a particular threshold, as spelled 
out in their respective foreign investment regimes.94 This shows, by implication, that market 
access is granted in principle. Otherwise, there would have been no need to include those 
reservations into the list of non-conforming measures.  
b. Carve-out in the TPP 
Instead of undercutting market access, the TPP gives the option to declare tobacco control 
measures non-actionable.95 It is questionable what the tobacco carve-out in Art. 29.5 TPP 
means for ISDS under NAFTA, given that all NAFTA States signed the TPP. Can tobacco 
companies resort to NAFTA tribunals with a view to circumventing the TPP carve-out? First 
of all, it should be noted that the carve-out could not be sidestepped by invoking the MFN 
obligation, as this obligation ‘does not encompass international dispute resolution procedures 
or mechanisms.’96 Pursuant to Art. 1.2.1 (b) TPP, the TPP is intended to coexist with NAFTA. 
Yet, each NAFTA Party merely ‘affirms’ its rights and obligations under NAFTA. Art. 1.2.1 
(b) TPP does not specify that the TPP ‘is not to be considered as incompatible with’ NAFTA 
in terms of Art. 30 (2) Vienna Convention. Rather, the TPP has a specific conflict clause: 
should the TPP be incompatible with NAFTA, Art. 1.2.2 TPP provides a special consultation 
procedure, which is modelled on Art. 2 (3) (Chapter 18) ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand 
FTA. Footnote 1 to Art. 1.2.2 TPP states that  
the fact that an agreement provides more favourable treatment of … investments … than 
that provided for under this Agreement does not mean that there is an inconsistency.  
Accordingly, the more favourable treatment of tobacco investments in NAFTA does not 
amount to an inconsistency within the meaning of the TPP. NAFTA prevails wherever it 
provides more favourable investment protection. It follows that the TPP carve-out does not 
apply to NAFTA Parties. 
It bears emphasizing that the tobacco carve-out is not mandatory. The TPP Parties ‘may’ 
opt out of ISDS with respect to tobacco control measures as defined in footnote 13 to Art. 29.5 
TPP. That is, they have discretion. The exercise of this discretion is restricted for NAFTA 
Parties by virtue of the affirmation in Art. 1.2.1 (b) TPP. In summary, even with the TPP being 
in force, there can still be disputes relating to tobacco control measures between an investor 
from a NAFTA State and another NAFTA State, but not other TPP Members, provided they 
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opted out, nor between an investor from a TPP Member that is not a NAFTA Party and a 
NAFTA Party.  
On a related note, it is disputed whether the later introduction of a jurisdictional carve-out 
would violate an existing FET standard in a treaty.97 However, only domestic acts of the host 
State are measured against the international minimum standard. To review the further 
concretization of that standard (through treaty amendment) in light of the extant standard would 
give it an absolute status that it does not have, viz. that of a peremptory norm of international 
law.98 Consequently, a ratification act to amend a treaty cannot violate that treaty; it could only 
violate jus cogens. 
c. Assessment 
Neither CETA nor the TPP goes as far as the China–Australia FTA, which excludes 
‘[m]easures of a Party that are non-discriminatory and for the legitimate public welfare 
objectives of public health, safety, the environment, public morals or public order.’99 Such 
measures are not subject to an ISDS claim. Instead, the matter goes to consultation with the 
State Parties.100  
 Safeguards against Forum Shopping 
Not directly related to the issue of sovereignty loss, but still relevant because it increases the 
exposure to litigation, is the problem of forum shopping. There is a plethora of bilateral and 
plurilateral treaties between the parties to mega-regionals that will remain in force unless the 
parties agree otherwise. What complicates the matter is that some of these agreements are 
dovetailed with each other via their respective MFN clauses. Mega-regionals seek to cut 
through this spaghetti bowl of regulations in an attempt to lower transaction costs for 
businesses within the respective trade bloc.101 As far as investment law is concerned, they have 
the potential to consolidate the patchwork of bilateral investment treaties and to further legal 
certainty.102 Still, a problem for the future will be to harmonize the different sets of rules 
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stipulated in mega-regionals, e.g. different rules of origin, which distort trade and may amount 
to non-tariff barriers to trade.103  
a. Trade Disputes 
A clash of jurisdictions with the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is prevented by choice-
of-forum and fork-in-the-road clauses. When the same case can be argued under both a mega-
regional and under the WTO Agreement, the complainant has a choice.104 Once dispute 
settlement proceedings are initiated under one of these agreements, that choice is final.105 Those 
clauses establish a pactum de non petendo between the disputing parties with respect to other 
forums not selected. The question is if Art. 30 (4) (a) Vienna Convention applies to the effect 
that the fork-in-the-road rule takes precedence over Art. 23 Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU),106 which prescribes the exclusivity of the multilateral system.107 
This issue was left open by the Appellate Body in Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks108 and 
only decided for the constellation where a fork-in-the-road clause was missing in the FTA.109 
As long as the FTA is permitted by the WTO Agreement,110 the WTO adjudicatory bodies 
should show deference to the choice of forum made by the disputing parties.111 In Peru – 
Agricultural Products, the Appellate Body accepted ‘the relinquishment of the right to initiate 
WTO dispute settlement proceedings’ in principle,112 but with the proviso that the 
relinquishment is confined to ‘the settlement of specific disputes.’113 
b. Investment Disputes 
If an investor is a multinational company, they can usually rely on more than one treaty, as 
exemplified in the CME/Lauder case (horizontal overlap).114 What if an investor has only one 
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nationality? A Vietnamese investor in Malaysia, for instance, will be able to rely on the BIT 
between Malaysia and Vietnam, the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA), 
and the TPP (vertical overlap). Both ACIA and TPP affirm existing rights and obligations.115 
That is, the lex posterior rule as set out in Art. 30 (3) Vienna Convention does not apply. Should 
the final text of RCEP contain an investment chapter, there would be a fourth option. Not 
surprisingly, UNCTAD stated that: 
With thousands of treaties, many ongoing negotiations and multiple dispute-settlement 
mechanisms, today’s [international investment agreement] regime has come close to a point 
where it is too big and complex to handle for governments and investors alike.116  
A vertical overlap is not conceivable in the context of Canada and the European Union. 
According to Art. 30.8.1, CETA replaces all BITs that EU Member States have with Canada. 
Art. 8.24 CETA regulates a possible horizontal overlap: the ISDS proceedings under CETA 
are to be stayed or have to take account of proceedings brought pursuant to another 
international agreement.  
As far as the TPP is concerned, a provision along the lines of Art. 8.24 CETA is lacking and 
the fork-in-the-road clause in Art. 28.4.2 TPP does not cover ISDS disputes (only disputes 
between the Parties). Instead, the TPP avails itself of the principle of estoppel: Art. 9.21.2 (b) 
TPP requires a claimant to waive ‘any right to initiate or continue before … any other dispute 
settlement procedures, any proceeding with respect to any measure alleged to constitute a 
breach.’ Another dispute settlement procedure in that sense would be, for example, a tribunal 
established under a BIT. The same regulatory technique is used in Art. 1121 (1) (b) NAFTA.117 
 Other Procedural Safeguards 
a. Safeguards against Frivolous Claims 
Frivolous claims are pre-empted.118 By quashing claims ‘manifestly without legal merit’ at an 
early stage, States save litigation costs, i.e. taxpayer’s money.  
b. Adoption of Authoritative Interpretations 
A powerful tool to gain back control from the adjudicatory bodies is through the adoption of 
authoritative interpretations. These are binding upon tribunals.119 States can thereby interfere 
with ongoing disputes, thus readjusting the separation of powers between them and dispute 
settlement bodies. This shows that, when it comes to ISDS, the parties’ right to regulate is given 
more weight than due process.  
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Like under NAFTA,120 the authority to issue interpretations under the TPP is limited to the 
investment chapter. As far as trade disputes are concerned, i.e. inter-State arbitration, TPP 
Members rely on the prohibition of an addition to or diminishment of rights and obligations,121 
as known from Arts 3.2, third sentence, and 19.2 DSU. The purpose is to rein in a usurpation 
of competences by the back door. However, it is left to the adjudicatory bodies themselves to 
decide when this is the case.  
In contrast, Art. IX:2 and 5 WTO Agreement additionally guarantees the WTO Members 
‘the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations,’ and so does CETA. The Appellate Body 
observed in US – Clove Cigarettes that ‘such interpretations are most akin to, but not exhaustive 
of, subsequent agreements on interpretation within the meaning of Art. 31 (3) (a) of the Vienna 
Convention.’122 According to Art. 26.1.5 (e), the CETA Joint Committee may adopt 
interpretations that are binding on both investment and trade tribunals.123  
Special rules exist for financial services and taxation measures. Committees comprising 
State representatives determine whether a prudential measure or a taxation measure is 
justified.124 Finally, Art. 9.26.2 TPP clarifies that it is the State Parties acting through the TPP 
Commission, not a tribunal, that delineate the scope of non-conforming measures. 
c. Selection of Arbitrators 
Moreover, States are capable of influencing tribunal procedures by appointing arbitrators to 
their liking.125 As the recent row over the reappointment of a member of the WTO Appellate 
Body illustrated, the same holds true for standing bodies.126 Whether taking influence in that 
way is conducive or detrimental to the legitimacy of the respective adjudicatory body is, of 
course, another question.  
d. Appeals Mechanism 
Finally, under CETA, the losing party to an investment dispute will be able to appeal to the 
Appellate Tribunal, established according to Art. 8.28. The TPP, by contrast, does not provide 
for an appellate review process.  
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 Non-Conforming Measures 
State Parties have the option to exclude entire government measures from the scope of a mega-
regional. This concerns existing measures as set out in Annex I127 as well as future measures 
as set out in Annex II.128 CETA also has an Annex III regarding the financial services sector in 
Canada. For instance, countries reserved the right to intervene in the residential housing 
market.129 For New Zealand, non-conforming measures include its cultural heritage, social 
services, water, as well as the foreshore and seabed.130  
 Right to Regulate  
An attempt to preserve sovereignty can be seen in the emphasis of the States’ right to regulate 
in mega-regionals. This approach may have been inspired by Recital 4 of the Preamble to 
GATS, which recognizes ‘the right of Members to regulate, and to introduce new regulations, 
on the supply of services within their territories in order to meet national policy objectives.’ 
The Appellate Body clarified in China – Publications and Audiovisual Products that ‘the right 
to regulate’ in the WTO encompasses (1) the power to take regulatory action that does not 
infringe the covered agreements and (2) the power to take regulatory action that derogates from 
the covered agreements but can be justified under an exception clause.131 
a. Right to Regulate in the TPP 
Recital 9 of the Preamble to the TPP underscores national sovereignty as enshrined in the 
‘inherent right to regulate.’ As the legal effect of the Preamble is limited,132 the framers 
elaborated that right, for instance, in the Investment as well as the Exceptions and General 
Provisions Chapters. Also, the right to regulate is buttressed by the right to exercise discretion 
with regard to the allocation of resources in the Chapters on Labour133 and the Environment.134 
One of the provisions of the Agreement that reflects the Parties’ right to regulate is Art. 9.16: 
Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or 
enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate 
to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to 
environmental, health or other regulatory objectives. 
Just like Art. 1114 (1) NAFTA, Art. 9.16 TPP does not constitute a fully-fledged exception 
clause by reason of the limitation ‘otherwise consistent.’ Consequently, no inconsistencies 
could be justified, no investors’ rights be overridden on that basis. Its legal effect is that it puts 
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beyond dispute that particular policy objectives (environment, health) are legitimate. This is of 
significance for the interpretation of, for example, ‘fair and equitable treatment’ within the 
meaning of Art. 9.6 TPP. In light of Art. 31 (2) Vienna Convention, however, Art. 9.16 TPP 
does not add anything to preambular para. 9 in terms of normative content, certainly not 
additional policy space. 
b. Right to Regulate in CETA 
The similar provision in CETA, Art. 8.9.1, does not contain the same limitation in the wording. 
Still, it states the obvious, as the mentioned policy fields have not been subjected to harmonized 
standards by CETA. The issue is to what extent the provisions and disciplines under a mega-
regional restrict the right to regulate. Art. 23.2 CETA and Art. 19.5.2 TPP exemplify this for 
the area of labour law. On the one hand, they reaffirm the right to regulate. This comprises the 
right to set priorities, to determine the level of protection, and to modify the laws. It also 
includes the discretionary power to allocate resources. On the other hand, the Articles make 
clear that the right to regulate ends where the international obligation begins. The same holds 
true for environmental law.135 The Joint Interpretative Instrument elaborates that.136 
c. Right to Regulate in TTIP 
Another example is Art. 2.1 of the TTIP investment chapter, as proposed by the European 
Union:137  
The provisions of this section shall not affect the right of the Parties to regulate within their 
territories through measures necessary to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as the 
protection of public health, safety, environment or public morals, social or consumer 
protection or promotion and protection of cultural diversity. 
It is questionable, however, whether the chosen formulation would be capable of actually 
achieving that goal. First of all, it should be noted that the proposed text does not contain an 
express limitation, which only guarantees the right to regulate through measures ‘otherwise 
consistent.’ So could measures inconsistent with the investment chapter in TTIP be upheld by 
the contracting parties? In other words, does Art. 2.1 (Investment) TTIP provide a real 
exception clause along the lines of Art. XX GATT/Art. XIV GATS or does it merely confirm 
the policy space that the contracting parties have in any event?  
The European Court of Human Rights has interpreted a similar formulation in the ECHR 
(‘the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary’ in Art. 1 (2) Protocol) as an 
exception clause.138 The concept of ‘margin of appreciation’ employed by the European Court 
of Human Rights is equivalent to the concept of ‘policy space’ used in the WTO.139 This would 
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mean that States could expropriate on that basis without having to pay compensation or they 
could justify a violation of the FET standard on grounds of environmental protection, public 
health or other legitimate policy objectives listed in Art. 2.1. Importantly, the list of objectives 
recognized as legitimate is not exhaustive. Following that, the level of investor protection in 
TTIP would remain below the customary minimum standard. It is beyond doubt that countries 
may derogate from customary international law. Hence, the TTIP would constitute lex specialis 
vis-à-vis the customary minimum standard.  
What might speak in favour of an exception clause is the fact that Art. 2.1 (Investment) 
TTIP is phrased quite differently from, e.g., the second sentence of Art. 2.2 WTO Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement).140 With regard to this provision, the 
Appellate Body clarified that the reference to a ‘legitimate objective’ establishes an additional 
requirement which a measure must fulfil for it to be WTO-consistent, not an exception.141 
Nevertheless, it is not apparent from reading the text of Art. 2.1 (Investment) TTIP that the 
right to regulate trumps the provisions of the investment section. It merely states that this 
section ‘shall not affect’ that right. The right to regulate has always been acknowledged. In 
China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, the Appellate Body stressed that the ‘right to 
regulate’ constitutes ‘an inherent power enjoyed by a Member’s government, rather than a right 
bestowed by international treaties.’142 That is, an investment tribunal might read Art. 2.1 as an 
affirmation of existing case law and not, as desired, a norm ensuring additional policy space 
for democratic legislatures. Art. 8.9.1 CETA is even couched that way (‘the Parties reaffirm 
their right to regulate’). 
 Regulatory Cooperation 
Regulatory cooperation can be distinguished from other forms of international cooperation, 
because it is more intrusive from a national perspective. It concerns harmonization behind 
borders with a view to reducing compliance costs. The chapters on regulatory cooperation in 
mega-regionals provide for the further development of these agreements and on this account 
are hugely controversial. The issue is whether that further development will occur outside the 
control of national parliaments.  
International cooperation presupposes that governments have some latitude to make 
decisions. International law recognizes that. According to Art. 11 Vienna Convention, the 
involvement of the legislature is not always required to express consent to be bound by a treaty. 
CETA, for instance, does not need to be ratified by the Canadian parliament.143 In WTO law it 
is accepted that ‘subsequent agreement’ within the meaning of Art. 31 (3) (a) Vienna 
Convention can be a committee decision by the WTO Membership.144 Gardiner confirms that 
 
 
140  WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (signed 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 
1868 UNTS 120. 
141  WTO United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products 
– Report of the Appellate Body (13 June 2012) WT/DS381/AB/R, 318. 
142  WTO China – Publications and Audiovisual Products – Report of the Appellate Body 222. 
143  L. Barnett, Canada’s Approach to the Treaty-Making Process (Parliament of Canada 6 November 2012) 3.3.1, 
available at www.parl.gc.ca/Default.aspx?Language=E (accessed 27 March 2017). 
144  WTO United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products 
– Report of the Appellate Body (13 June 2012) WT/DS381/AB/R, 372. 
 
a subsequent agreement does not need to ‘have the same formal status as the instrument which 
is interpreted.’145 
So what is the national law perspective? Regularly, the competences exercised by regulatory 
bodies would have been delegated to (administrative) authorities in national systems, that is, 
would have left the province of the legislature in any event (e.g., through enabling clauses). 
The determination of contact points would be an innocuous example.  
It is common practice that national lawmakers set the general legal framework and leave it 
to administrative authorities to flesh out and implement statutory acts. The reasons for doing 
so are manifold: flexibility required to find a just solution, lack of expertise, to keep the act 
relevant and up to date. This last reason is true of mega-regionals as well and propelled the 
inclusion of provisions on regulatory cooperation.  
To pass constitutional muster, regulatory cooperation must not be unfettered. This raises the 
question of the terms of reference of regulatory bodies. What, if any, are their limitations? As 
a preliminary point, it should be noted that, as seen, authoritative interpretations issued by 
regulatory bodies, e.g. regarding the investment chapter, actually serve to preserve national 
autonomy, as they rein in the discretion of investment tribunals. According to Art. 30.2.2, first 
sentence, CETA, ‘the CETA Joint Committee may decide to amend the protocols and annexes 
of this Agreement.’ However, the fourth sentence rules out this procedure for sensitive policy 
fields:  
amendments to Annexes I, II and III and to amendments to the annexes of Chapters Eight 
(Investment), Nine (Cross-Border Trade in Services), Ten (Temporary Entry and Stay of 
Natural Persons for Business Purposes) and Thirteen (Financial Services), except for Annex 
10-A (List of Contact Points of the Member States of the European Union). 
Significant changes still need to be approved by national legislatures.146 
As for the TPP, Art. 25.1 makes clear that ‘regulatory coherence’ is limited to measures 
‘adopted by regulatory agencies.’ This excludes measures enacted by legislatures. Thus, the 
policy space of national lawmakers is not interfered with. The TPP only seeks to harmonize 
measures which national legislatures have mandated regulatory agencies, i.e. the executive, to 
adopt. The same is true of CETA, where Art. 21.1 confines the scope of the chapter on 
regulatory cooperation ‘to the development, review and methodological aspects of regulatory 
measures of the Parties’ regulatory authorities.’ The consensus principle as practiced in the 
regulatory cooperation bodies147 additionally safeguards national autonomy. Binding decisions 
cannot be made against the will of a State. This is in line with the international law model to 
assure legitimacy through consent.148 The Joint Interpretative Instrument affirms that  
regulatory authorities can cooperate on a voluntary basis but do not have an obligation to do 
so, or to apply the outcome of their cooperation.149 
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 Exceptions 
The primary place where policy space is ensured is in the exception clauses, with the general 
exceptions being the broadest in scope. This is where the degree of surrender of sovereignty is 
ultimately decided.150 In other words, exceptions actually realize the aforementioned right to 
regulate. 
a. General Exceptions 
Mega-regionals build on the WTO acquis and incorporate the general exceptions Art. XX 
GATT and Art. XIV GATS,151 including the relevant case law.152 Members may act 
inconsistently with mega-regionals for the sake of competing interests. This methodology is 
not free from doubt because it makes trade liberalization the rule and other societal values and 
interests the exception, requiring justification.153 However, the Appellate Body has alleviated 
this concern to some extent by clarifying in US – Gasoline and EC – Hormones that exceptions 
are not to be interpreted narrowly as a rule.154 This would only be the case if the WTO 
agreements pursued one predominant objective, which they do not according to their 
preambles.155 Rather, exception clauses are the place where conflicting societal interests are 
weighed up, commensurate with the principle of proportionality, with a view to optimizing the 
realization of the interests at stake.156  
i. Scope 
Another issue remains. The catalogue of protected interests in the general exceptions in the 
WTO is exhaustive and cannot be extended by way of interpretation. The way out in WTO law 
is to request a waiver, which only provides a temporary remedy.157 Thus, mega-regionals 
import a problem that also challenged EU primary law. In principle, societal values and 
interests can be taken into account at two stages: in the delineation of the scope of (1) the 
substantive rights and obligations and/or (2) exception clauses.158  
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In Cassis de Dijon, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) developed the doctrine of 
mandatory requirements.159 This became necessary after the Court had successively expanded 
the scope of the fundamental freedoms from a prohibition of discrimination to a prohibition of 
restrictions.160 The exception clauses provided for in the TFEU161 are consequently too narrow 
to do justice to the legitimate concern of the EU Member States to regulate domestic matters 
in the public interest, given that the lists of recognized public welfare goals, able to justify 
infringements of the TFEU, are closed ones.162 The solution found by the ECJ was to read 
important societal values and interests that may conflict with the policy objective of an internal 
market in a particular case into the fundamental freedoms as inherent limitations. Since Cassis 
de Dijon, this has become settled case law of the ECJ, as enunciated in a recent decision 
regarding the free movement of goods: 
[O]bstacles to the free movement of goods which are the consequence of applying, to goods 
coming from other Member States where they are lawfully manufactured and marked, rules 
that lay down requirements to be met by such goods constitute measures having equivalent 
effect prohibited by Art. 34 TFEU. This is so even if those rules apply without distinction 
to all products unless their application can be justified by a public-interest objective taking 
precedence over the free movement of goods.163 
The Appellate Body paved the way for a similar development in WTO law in EC – 
Asbestos.164 In that case, the national treatment obligation, Art. III:4 GATT, was at issue and 
the question what legal implications the health risks associated with asbestos have. The 
Appellate Body noted that ‘evidence relating to the health risks associated with a product may 
be pertinent in an examination of “likeness”.’165 In the same vein, the panel in Canada – Wheat 
Exports and Grain Imports observed that ‘different treatment’ is not tantamount to ‘less 
favourable treatment,’ as ‘there may be legitimate reasons for Canada to treat domestic grain 
and like imported grain differently, for example, because the latter has not been subjected to 
the Canadian quality assurance system.’166 Furthermore, the Appellate Body held in EC – 
Asbestos that ‘a Member may draw distinctions between products which have been found to 
be “like”, without, for this reason alone, according to the group of “like” imported products 
“less favourable treatment” than that accorded to the group of “like” domestic products.’167 In 
principle, societal values and interests could be taken into account in the likeness test or the 
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‘less favourable treatment’ element.168 As to the latter, the Appellate Body dealt a blow to this 
line of argument in EC – Seal Products.169 This is where the analyses under Art. III:4 GATT 
and Art. 2.1 TBT Agreement differ: the Appellate Body reads the legitimate objectives set forth 
in the Preamble to the TBT Agreement, i.e. what would be discussed under an exception clause 
in GATT, into Art. 2.1.170  
The same questions will arise under mega-regionals and will call for answers. The TPP 
confirms the approach of the Appellate Body with respect to the non-discrimination principle 
in the investment chapter: 
For greater certainty, whether treatment is accorded in ‘like circumstances’ under Art. 9.4 
(National Treatment) or Art. 9.5 (Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment) depends on the totality 
of the circumstances, including whether the relevant treatment distinguishes between 
investors or investments on the basis of legitimate public welfare objectives.171 
ii. Interplay between Exceptions and Rights and Obligations 
The aforementioned case law is indicative of an interplay between the scope of exceptions, on 
the one hand, and the scope of rights and obligations, on the other hand. The broader the scope 
of the exceptions, the more broadly the scope of the rights and obligations can be interpreted. 
In other words, the breadth of the substantive rights and obligations must be matched by equally 
broad exception clauses.172 Otherwise, the adjudicating bodies would need to step in and sort 
out the resultant mismatch by connecting societal values and interests to particular elements of 
the former.173 
An example from investment law illustrates this: the FET standard in Art. 10 (1) Japan–
Korea BIT174 is not confined to customary international law and consequently broader than the 
FET standard in Art. 5 (1) Trilateral Agreement between those two countries and China, which 
refers to the ‘standard of treatment accorded in accordance with generally accepted rules of 
international law.’175 By the same token, the Japan–Korea BIT has public health and public 
order exceptions in Art. 16 (1) (c) and (d), unlike the Trilateral Agreement that only contains 
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security exceptions in Art. 18 thereof.176 The same phenomenon can be found in municipal law 
as well. For instance, the German constitutional court interprets the basic right of human 
dignity in Art. 1 (1) Basic Law177 narrowly and only subsumes the ‘core of personality’ 
thereunder, because the German Constitution does not allow any deviation from the 
inviolability of this prescription.178  
iii. Assessment 
In the final analysis, there is an interplay between the scope of substantive rights and 
obligations and the scope of exception clauses: both must match. This is something to keep in 
mind when interpreting and applying mega-regionals in the future. Their rights and obligations 
must be read in light of the breadth of the exception clauses contained therein so as to ensure a 
proper balance between competing societal values and interests. In the following, we will 
examine what the implications of this rule-exception paradigm are for investors’ rights.  
b. Exceptions and Investment  
Investment rules are disputed because they allegedly do not take sufficient account of other 
legitimate societal values and interests of the host State.179 CETA provides exceptions for the 
establishment of investments and non-discriminatory treatment in Art. 28.3.2, the general 
exceptions provision. By contrast, the general exceptions of the TPP as set out in Art. 29.1 do 
not apply to the investment chapter. Only the provision on performance requirements has a 
specialized exception clause in Art. 9.10.3 (d) and (h). From this it follows that violations of 
the international minimum standard of treatment or the right to compensation in the event of 
expropriation can only be justified on the basis of customary international law. This raises the 
question of whether customary international law can serve as a defence to claims under mega-
regionals. The prevailing view seems to reject that as far as trade disputes are concerned,180 
whereas in investment disputes it is commonplace. The governing law is not limited to the 
agreement but also includes other rules of international law that are applicable.181 By 
incorporating customary international law standards into the agreements,182 the parties also 
incorporate, by implication, concomitant limitations and exceptions, i.e. force majeure and the 
doctrine of necessity as laid down in the Articles on State Responsibility.183 Following the 
above argumentation, the scope of those rights and obligations must be narrowly delineated, as 
limited exceptions suggest to interpret substantive rights and obligations narrowly.  
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c. Definition of Indirect Expropriation 
The concept of ‘indirect expropriation’ is worth mentioning in this context. It ensures that 
States cannot circumvent their obligation to compensate foreign investors that have been 
deprived of their possessions but left their title pro forma. Having said that, this taking must be 
equivalent to expropriation. The government action must amount to an expropriation with the 
only exception of the formal title remaining untouched. Anything less, e.g. a mere reduction in 
value of the investment, would not qualify as an indirect expropriation. Para. 3 (b) Annex 9-B 
to the TPP clarifies that  
Non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect 
legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment, do 
not constitute indirect expropriations, except in rare circumstances. 
In light of its wording (‘except in rare circumstances’), the provision falls short of an exception 
clause. However, it is more than just window dressing. The phrase ‘in rare circumstances’ 
provides a guideline for treaty interpreters to interpret the requirements of indirect 
expropriation restrictively as far as health measures, environmental measures, etc. are 
concerned. The same holds true for para. 3 Annex 8-A (Expropriation) to CETA.  
Moreover, CETA makes certain in Art. 8.12.6 that ‘the revocation, limitation or creation of 
intellectual property rights, to the extent that these measures are consistent with the TRIPS 
Agreement and Chapter Twenty (Intellectual Property), do not constitute expropriation.’ It 
further lays down, in the second sentence, that a mere violation of international IP obligations 
‘does not establish an expropriation.’ This provision is a legislative response to the Eli Lilly 
case.184 
d. Treaty of Waitangi Exception  
One of the most astounding provisions in the TPP is Art. 29.6, the Treaty of Waitangi 
exception. It gives New Zealand a blanket provision to deviate from the TPP and, for instance, 
to run affirmative action programmes for the benefit of its indigenous population. By the same 
token, it deprives the New Zealand government of the otherwise possible argument that it 
cannot implement a particular obligation under the Treaty of Waitangi because it would be at 
odds with its international obligations. The Treaty of Waitangi establishes a special partnership 
between the Crown and the Māori, New Zealand’s indigenous people. Among other things, it 
obliges the New Zealand government to actively protect Māori interests.185 
i. Broad Scope 
The Treaty of Waitangi exception is remarkable for its broad scope. Whereas other TPP 
signatories with an indigenous population rely on annex exemptions, such as Australia,186 
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Peru,187 or Chile,188 the scope of Art. 29.6 is not confined to investment and trade in services 
but applies to all chapters (‘nothing in this Agreement’). Furthermore, New Zealand may 
‘accord more favourable treatment to Maori’ regardless of whether this is called for under the 
Treaty of Waitangi (‘including’). The title of the provision (‘Treaty of Waitangi’) does not 
amount to a limitation of the scope to Treaty obligations. It is clear from the objective of the 
TPP to establish equal conditions of competition between the TPP Members189 that the more 
favourable treatment is in relation to foreign traders and investors.190 Art. 29.6 TPP thus 
provides a defence against an infringement of the national treatment obligations in the TPP.191 
On a related note, other measures which the New Zealand government may adopt to put the 
Treaty of Waitangi into effect but which are outside the remit of the TPP do not require 
justification under the TPP (‘in respect of matters covered by this Agreement’).192  
Normally, the TPP would take precedence over a Member’s internal law from an 
international law perspective. Not even the constitution of a country can be used as an excuse 
for non-compliance according to Art. 27 Vienna Convention. Art. 29.6.1 TPP reverses that 
precept. What is more, the clause is self-judging (‘deems’) and the exercise of discretion on 
the part of New Zealand is non-actionable pursuant to para. 2 thereof. Whether a particular 
government measure actually improves the situation of Māori can therefore not be challenged 
before a TPP panel. A panel could ‘only’ find an inconsistency of that measure with the TPP, 
but no violation, because the New Zealand measure would be justified pursuant to para. 1. That 
is, a panel could not attach any legal consequences to the found inconsistency, notably not force 
New Zealand to withdraw the inconsistent measure.193  
Inconsistency, i.e. whether an infringement occurred, is only the first step in the legal 
analysis, the second step being whether the infringement is justifiable under an exception 
clause. Consequently, by stipulating that ‘A panel … may be requested to determine only 
whether any measure referred to in paragraph 1 is inconsistent with a Party’s rights under this 
Agreement,’ Art. 29.6.2, third sentence, TPP states the obvious, namely that ‘nothing in this 
Agreement shall preclude the adoption by New Zealand of measures.’ The third sentence of 
para. 2 does not add anything that would not already flow from para. 1. Other exceptions 
dispense with this clarification. For instance, Art. XIV GATS merely provides that ‘nothing in 
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member of 
measures.’ All the legal effects of an exception clause are encapsulated in that phrase.  
From a New Zealand point of view, it is important that the TPP does not prejudge the nature 
and legal status of the Treaty of Waitangi in the New Zealand legal order. What obligations 
there are under the Treaty is not subject to scrutiny.194 A TPP panel would only consider 
national law ‘as evidence of compliance or non-compliance with international obligations’ 
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along the lines of the Havana Club ruling.195 Also, who identifies as Māori is an internal matter 
and would be outside the jurisdiction of a TPP panel. It is New Zealand law that determines 
what a Māori business is. 
ii. Abuse of Rights 
Exception clauses are limited themselves and have to be interpreted in good faith, in particular 
abus de droit, and in light of competing interests, notably the right to trade. This finds 
expression in the chapeau of Art. XX GATT and Art. XIV GATS. In German legal thinking 
the chapeau constitutes a Schranken-Schranke, i.e. a limitation on an exception. The Treaty of 
Waitangi exception clause is restricted by the introductory phrase in para. 1:  
Provided that such measures are not used as a means of arbitrary or unjustified 
discrimination against persons of the other Parties or as a disguised restriction on trade in 
goods, trade in services and investment. 
This wording is inspired by the chapeau of the general WTO exceptions, which the Appellate 
Body read as an embodiment of the doctrine of abuse of rights.196 Although the Appellate Body 
made this statement only with respect to Art. XX GATT, it also holds true for Art. XIV 
GATS.197  
The doctrine of abuse of rights is a general principle of law within the meaning of Art. 38 
(1) (c) Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute),198 derived from the tenet of 
good faith.199 Good faith itself constitutes a fundamental principle of international law of which 
States cannot contract out.200 That is, even without its inclusion, the prohibition of abuse of 
rights would apply in accordance with Art. 26 Vienna Convention: ‘Every treaty in force … 
must be performed … in good faith.’ 
This raises the question in what constellations an abuse of rights might be given. Currently, 
the Māori population of New Zealand makes up around 15 per cent, and according to Statistics 
New Zealand it is growing.201 Let us assume for argument’s sake that someday in the future 
half of the New Zealand population identifies as Māori. If, in such a situation, New Zealand 
used the Treaty of Waitangi exception to protect half of its economy, its trading partners would 
argue – and rightly so – that this is not the deal anymore they entered into, as a level playing 
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field is no longer given. In the author’s view, this would be an example of a violation of the 
introductory phrase of para. 1. The Treaty of Waitangi exception clause was introduced to 
protect minority rights in New Zealand. Solely on that basis was it accepted by the other 
contracting parties. 
iii. Assessment  
The Treaty of Waitangi exception gives New Zealand ample discretion to favour Māori 
businesses. In fact, it places New Zealand (constitutional) law above the TPP. That New 
Zealand’s trading partners have accepted such a broad exception clause in favour of one party 
can only be explained by the fact that New Zealand has never abused such clauses in its other 
FTAs and because of its clean sheet towards foreign businesses and investors.202 
There is no exception in the WTO agreements specifically favouring indigenous peoples. 
That is, under WTO law, New Zealand has no recourse to a Treaty of Waitangi defence. 
However, it included a provision to the same effect in the national treatment column of its 
GATS Schedule: with regard to all four modes of supply, New Zealand is  
Unbound for current and future measures at the central and sub-central levels according 
more favourable treatment to any Maori person or organisation in relation to the acquisition, 
establishment or operation of any commercial or industrial undertaking.203 
As a horizontal commitment, it applies to all service sectors covered. In conclusion, New 
Zealand is free to favour Māori service providers, but not producers of goods, without violating 
the WTO national treatment obligation. 
 Remedies  
One cannot assess the intrusion of a mega-regional into the national legal order without having 
regard to the clout of its enforcement mechanism. This concerns the question of available 
remedies. Here again, one has to distinguish between trade and investment disputes. 
a. Trade Disputes 
Non-compliance with trade rules comes with considerable costs for the perpetrating State in 
the form of suspended concessions, i.e. legalized trade barriers. Nevertheless, the respondent 
has the opportunity to pay compensation and maintain the inconsistent measure. Although 
billed as ‘temporary,’204 this can be a very long period of time, as the WTO case EC – 
Hormones illustrates.205  
When the WTO has authorized the suspension of concessions under the DSU, it is 
questionable whether, by making use of the authorization, the suspending State violates an 
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existing FTA between the parties to the dispute. Conversely, when a party suspends benefits 
under an FTA, the question arises whether, in doing so, it violates the WTO Agreement.  
The general international law stance is that, in terms of hierarchy of norms, all treaties, WTO 
Agreement and FTAs, are at the same level. The WTO, however, claims an elevated position: 
It checks whether FTAs are in conformity with its own rules.206 Its dispute settlement 
mechanism is exclusive commensurate with Art. 23 DSU. The WTO system thus appears to be 
a kind of universal ‘trade constitution.’ This is the WTO perspective. The issue is how other 
trading regimes respond to that.  
First of all, it should be recalled that, under both the TPP and CETA, the contracting parties 
reaffirm their rights and obligations they have under the WTO Agreement.207 In line with this, 
CETA clarifies in Art. 29.3.4, first sentence, that ‘Nothing in this Agreement shall preclude a 
Party from implementing the suspension of obligations authorised by the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body.’ A provision to the same effect can be found in Art. 29.1.4 TPP. As to the 
reverse case, i.e. when obligations under a mega-regional are suspended, Art. 29.3.4, second 
sentence, CETA provides that ‘A Party may not invoke the WTO Agreement to preclude the 
other Party from suspending obligations pursuant to this Chapter.’ A regulation along the same 
lines is lacking in the TPP. Here, the fork-in-the-road clause, Art. 28.4.2, comes into play, 
stipulating a pactum de non petendo regarding the suspension of the TPP.  
b. Investment Disputes 
From a host State’s perspective, the worst case scenario in an investment dispute would be if 
the State had to compensate a foreign investor. But it would be under no obligation to change 
its domestic law, for remedies are limited to monetary damages and restitution of property 
(‘only’), plus legal costs; no punitive damages are awarded.208 Art. 8.31.2 CETA expressly 
stipulates that ‘The Tribunal shall not have jurisdiction to determine the legality of a measure, 
alleged to constitute a breach of this Agreement, under the domestic law of the disputing Party.’ 
Still, it is feared that the looming duty to pay compensation, hanging over the heads of 
national lawmakers like the sword of Damocles, leads to a regulatory chill in policy areas of 
societal importance such as health or the environment.209 The delay of plain packaging 
legislation in New Zealand is a case in point. 
Let us be clear: regulatory chill is an issue because ISDS is so effective. In the author’s 
view, the solution lies in the framers defining ‘loss’ in a restrictive way, not in the outright 
rejection of ISDS. To rein in ISDS, a jurisdictional carve-out seems arbitrary. The negotiators 
might miss some sensitive measures or, on the other extreme, they limit the jurisdiction to an 
extent that would completely undermine locus standi. How can it be justified to exclude 
tobacco control measures in the TPP but not other measures pursuing an equally important 
public welfare goal? What about other threats to health such as sugary or junk food? As seen, 
neither will a ‘right to regulate’ yield the desired outcome unless it is designed as a proper 
exception clause. When it comes to the crunch, a right to regulate could not justify a derogation 
from existing international law obligations.  
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What causes the regulatory chill is the obligation under Art. 36 (2) Articles on State 
Responsibility to compensate for lost profits. The article reads as follows: ‘The compensation 
shall cover any financially assessable damage including loss of profits insofar as it is 
established.’ What the parties, therefore, could do to take away the edge off ISDS is to contract 
out of that obligation and provide panels with guidance as to the calculation of damages.  
There are different ways to calculate damages depending on the loss suffered. All in all, 
three types of losses can be distinguished: restitution loss, reliance loss, and expectation loss.210 
Expectation loss is the loss of the bargain.211 Compensation in this case comprises the receipt 
of the promised performance.212 This includes lost profits.213 Whereas restitution and reliance 
loss constitute actual losses, the innocent party, under the head of ‘expectation loss,’ receives 
something that it hoped to get but never had.214 Consequently, the rationale for compensating 
expectation loss is less compelling.215  
Given the way Art. 36 (2) Articles on State Responsibility is phrased, it is applicable not 
only when another State is the complaining party but also to ISDS. Accordingly, damages 
consequent on a violation of investors’ rights are recoverable. This is the case regardless of 
whether the investors’ rights are derived from an investment contract or a treaty. Nevertheless, 
the Articles on State Responsibility merely reflect customary international law,216 which means 
that States can contract out of this obligation to pay for loss of profits.217 They could issue an 
authoritative interpretation218 explicitly limiting an investment award to compensation for 
accrued losses, by clarifying that ‘loss’ within the meaning of the respective agreement219 refers 
to loss of the investment, not loss of profits. This would confine investment claims to actual 
losses, e.g. the investor’s expenditures, with the consequence that if foreign investors wanted 
to recover their lost profits, they would have to fall back on national courts. Such clarification 
by the parties would be a potent tool to control the budgetary implications of investment 
disputes, while preserving ISDS. Should an investment treaty demand the exhaustion of local 
remedies, this bifurcation of remedies would not even prolong the proceedings.  
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 Withdrawal 
Finally, as a last resort, States can withdraw from a mega-regional they previously joined in 
accordance with Art. 54 (a) Vienna Convention, with all the economic costs that this step 
entails.220 The looming Brexit from the European Union shows that this is no longer a 
hypothetical scenario.  
III. Conclusion  
A court or tribunal derives its authority from the legal instrument creating it: for a constitutional 
court, this would be the constitution; for an administrative court, a national act; for the 
International Court of Justice, the UN Charter. Thus, the legitimacy crisis of, in particular, 
investment tribunals is tantamount to a crisis of the underlying legal instruments. This crisis is 
fuelled by a fear of competence shift away from national parliaments towards the international 
realm. People do not vote on international rules; the law-making procedure is mediated through 
the State governments.221 
Cottier stresses that ‘Legitimacy depends upon underlying values.’222 When negotiating 
FTAs, notably mega-regionals, culture and shared values matter. So does the political 
dimension of those agreements. Governments tend to prioritize FTAs with friendly 
governments with which they already have a robust trade relationship. Common values can 
smooth the way politically, but not always, as the headwind against CETA and TTIP 
demonstrates. The birth pangs of these two agreements can be explained by the fact that there 
is not one hegemonic party that could foist its model on the other party.223 As a result, the 
agreements are likely to lead to changes in the legal orders on both sides. Considering the size 
of the participating economies, the positive as well as negative effects will be palpable.  
According to modern understanding, human rights are not only political rights but also 
include economic rights.224 International trade and investment law realizes economic freedom 
across borders.225 Otherwise, the right to trade and invest would be confined to a particular 
jurisdiction. To the extent that national sovereignty is restricted, individual economic freedom 
is achieved on the international plane. We can find the same conflict in national law as well: 
civil liberties are supposed to protect the individual from State interference, in a democracy 
from the rule of the majority (status negativus).226 Against this backdrop, sovereignty, even if 
backed by the demos, ought not to be treated as sacrosanct. There can be no doubt that for the 
world economic order to function, international cooperation is imperative, which, in turn, 
requires the participating States to let the exercise of their sovereignty rest to some degree. 
Some common rules are needed to this end. 
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In truth, it is about the allocation of responsibilities at the right level of governance.227 The 
concept of sovereignty is not helpful in that regard. Rather, which level of governance 
(municipal, regional, national, international) is best suited to protect societal values and 
interests is the fundamental question. That is, there is not only the power struggle between 
different branches of government (i.e., the executive, legislative, and judicial branch), but also 
between different layers of governance. Bearing this in mind, the debate surrounding mega-
regionals boils down to the proper delimitation of competences. Nationally, this task is 
performed by constitutional law; internationally, it is often left to adjudicators to draw the 
dividing line.  
The misgivings about mega-regionals, in general, and ISDS, in particular, stem from a worry 
that the proposed agreements do not strike the right balance, with the consequence that not 
enough policy space is left for national legislatures. The drafters sought to preserve regulatory 
autonomy by building into the agreements certain safeguards. Importantly, these safeguards 
cannot be evaded by foreign investors importing more favourable treatment under other treaties 
on grounds of MFN arguments. Art. 8.7.4, second sentence, CETA provides that:  
Substantive obligations in other international investment treaties and other trade agreements 
do not in themselves constitute ‘treatment’, and thus cannot give rise to a breach of this 
[MFN] Article, absent measures adopted or maintained by a Party pursuant to those 
obligations. 
A similar clarification is missing in the TPP, a fact that might compel the TPP Members to 
adopt an authoritative interpretation in the future. Art. 9.5.3 TPP merely spells out that the 
MFN obligation does not extend to provisions on dispute resolution. 
At large, to guarantee policy space is the very function of exception clauses. Therefore, the 
scope of these clauses is key, as well as the operation of the principle of proportionality 
thereunder.228 These are the parameters within which the negotiators have to make a decision: 
the broader the exceptions, the greater the autonomy of States. The more flexible the exceptions 
are designed, the less legal certainty prevails. It is sensible to model the exceptions on the tried 
and tested WTO exceptions, thus incorporating the wealth of WTO case law. But neither the 
TPP nor CETA remedy the problem that only particular policy objectives can justify an 
infringement.  
In summary, two lessons can be learned for the negotiations of TTIP and RCEP, 
respectively: Firstly, the list of legitimate policy objectives that can justify a violation should 
not be exhaustive. Secondly, the exceptions should be applicable to the investment chapter as 
well. As to the first point, having a non-exhaustive list would make the development of 
mandatory requirements à la Cassis de Dijon superfluous. This would streamline the legal 
analysis. As to the second point, a broad exception clause that encompasses the investment 
chapter makes the discussion on ISDS less acute.229 Even the need for a tobacco carve-out 
along the lines of Art. 29.5 TPP, given that such a clause will always include health, would be 
less pressing.  
As to the desirability of broad exceptions, pronouncements in both directions can be found. 
In Pope & Talbot v. Canada, the tribunal noted that ‘a blanket exception for regulatory 
 
 
227  Cottier, ‘Multilayered Governance, Pluralism, and Moral Conflict’ 656. 
228  See Riffel, ‘Human Rights Protection in the Asia-Pacific: What Will Be the Role of the TPP?’ 343–344, 347–
348. 
229  See, e.g., Art. 9.8 China–Australia FTA. 
 
measures would create a gaping loophole in international protections against expropriation.’230 
Contrariwise, the tribunals in SD Myers v. Canada and Lemire v. Ukraine referenced the ‘high 
measure of deference that international law generally extends to the right of domestic 
authorities to regulate matters within their own borders.’231 The Award in Marvin Feldman v. 
Mexico ties in with that:  
governments must be free to act in the broader public interest through protection of the 
environment … Reasonable governmental regulation of this type cannot be achieved if any 
business that is adversely affected may seek compensation …232  
What seems to be clear is that the exceptions to investors’ rights under customary international 
law (force majeure, necessity) are not sufficient to ensure the right balance between 
international protection of foreign investments and regulatory autonomy, as adjudicating 
bodies tend to interpret substantive rights and obligations (e.g., non-discrimination, FET) 
broadly and exceptions under customary international law narrowly.233 If States wanted to go 
one step further and deprive ISDS of its edge, while still maintaining the system, they could do 
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